graphiti/.serena/memories/multi_user_security_analysis.md
Lars Varming 341efd8c3d Fix: Critical database parameter bug + index creation error handling
CRITICAL FIX - Database Parameter (graphiti_core):
- Fixed graphiti_core/driver/neo4j_driver.py execute_query method
- database_ parameter was incorrectly added to params dict instead of kwargs
- Now correctly passed as keyword argument to Neo4j driver
- Impact: All queries now execute in configured database (not default 'neo4j')
- Root cause: Violated Neo4j Python driver API contract

Technical Details:
Previous code (BROKEN):
  params.setdefault('database_', self._database)  # Wrong - in params dict
  result = await self.client.execute_query(cypher_query_, parameters_=params, **kwargs)

Fixed code (CORRECT):
  kwargs.setdefault('database_', self._database)  # Correct - in kwargs
  result = await self.client.execute_query(cypher_query_, parameters_=params, **kwargs)

FIX - Index Creation Error Handling (MCP server):
- Added graceful handling for Neo4j IF NOT EXISTS bug
- Prevents MCP server crash when indices already exist
- Logs warning instead of failing initialization
- Handles EquivalentSchemaRuleAlreadyExists error gracefully

Files Modified:
- graphiti_core/driver/neo4j_driver.py (3 lines changed)
- mcp_server/src/graphiti_mcp_server.py (12 lines added error handling)
- mcp_server/pyproject.toml (version bump to 1.0.5)

Testing:
- Python syntax validation: PASSED
- Ruff formatting: PASSED
- Ruff linting: PASSED

Closes issues with:
- Data being stored in wrong Neo4j database
- MCP server crashing on startup with EquivalentSchemaRuleAlreadyExists
- NEO4J_DATABASE environment variable being ignored

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-10 11:37:16 +01:00

100 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown

# Multi-User Security Analysis - Group ID Isolation
## Analysis Date: November 9, 2025
## Question: Should LLMs be able to specify group_id in multi-user LibreChat?
**Answer: NO - This creates a security vulnerability**
## Security Issue
**Current Risk:**
- Multiple users → Separate MCP instances → Shared database (Neo4j/FalkorDB)
- If LLM can specify `group_id` parameter, User A can access User B's data
- group_id is just a database filter, not a security boundary
**Example Attack:**
```python
# User A's LLM could run:
search_nodes(query="passwords", group_ids=["user_b_456"])
# This would search User B's graph!
```
## Recommended Solution
**Option 3: Security Flag (RECOMMENDED)**
Add configurable enforcement of session isolation:
```yaml
# config.yaml
graphiti:
group_id: ${GRAPHITI_GROUP_ID:main}
enforce_session_isolation: ${ENFORCE_SESSION_ISOLATION:false}
```
For LibreChat multi-user:
```yaml
env:
GRAPHITI_GROUP_ID: "{{LIBRECHAT_USER_ID}}"
ENFORCE_SESSION_ISOLATION: "true" # NEW: Force isolation
```
**Tool Implementation:**
```python
@mcp.tool()
async def search_nodes(
query: str,
group_ids: list[str] | None = None,
...
):
if config.graphiti.enforce_session_isolation:
# Security: Always use session group_id
effective_group_ids = [config.graphiti.group_id]
if group_ids and group_ids != [config.graphiti.group_id]:
logger.warning(
f"Security: Ignoring group_ids {group_ids}. "
f"Using session group_id: {config.graphiti.group_id}"
)
else:
# Backward compat: Allow group_id override
effective_group_ids = group_ids or [config.graphiti.group_id]
```
## Benefits
1. **Secure by default for LibreChat**: Set flag = true
2. **Backward compatible**: Single-user deployments can disable flag
3. **Explicit security**: Logged warnings show attempted breaches
4. **Flexible**: Supports both single-user and multi-user use cases
## Implementation Scope
**7 tools need security enforcement:**
1. add_memory
2. search_nodes (+ search_memory_nodes wrapper)
3. get_entities_by_type
4. search_memory_facts
5. compare_facts_over_time
6. get_episodes
7. clear_graph
**5 tools don't need changes:**
- get_entity_edge (UUID-based, already isolated)
- delete_entity_edge (UUID-based)
- delete_episode (UUID-based)
- get_status (global status, no data access)
## Security Properties After Fix
✅ Users cannot access other users' data
✅ LLM hallucinations/errors can't breach isolation
✅ Prompt injection attacks can't steal data
✅ Configurable for different deployment scenarios
✅ Logged warnings for security monitoring
## Related Documentation
- LibreChat Setup: DOCS/Librechat.setup.md
- Verification: .serena/memories/librechat_integration_verification.md
- Implementation: mcp_server/src/graphiti_mcp_server.py