From 21f21e34c9445cfd96349ae68ac573f23497587e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: buua436 Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 15:21:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Feat:update webhook component --- agent/canvas.py | 2 +- agent/component/base.py | 2 +- agent/component/webhook.py | 20 ++ api/apps/sdk/agents.py | 645 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/agent/canvas.py b/agent/canvas.py index b693ed434..e3feee016 100644 --- a/agent/canvas.py +++ b/agent/canvas.py @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ class Graph: return self._tenant_id def get_value_with_variable(self,value: str) -> Any: - pat = re.compile(r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*") + pat = re.compile(r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*") out_parts = [] last = 0 diff --git a/agent/component/base.py b/agent/component/base.py index 6ac95e09a..dcb3b0136 100644 --- a/agent/component/base.py +++ b/agent/component/base.py @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ class ComponentParamBase(ABC): class ComponentBase(ABC): component_name: str thread_limiter = trio.CapacityLimiter(int(os.environ.get('MAX_CONCURRENT_CHATS', 10))) - variable_ref_patt = r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*" + variable_ref_patt = r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*" def __str__(self): """ diff --git a/agent/component/webhook.py b/agent/component/webhook.py index c707d4556..61caaa0bc 100644 --- a/agent/component/webhook.py +++ b/agent/component/webhook.py @@ -23,6 +23,26 @@ class WebhookParam(ComponentParamBase): """ def __init__(self): super().__init__() + self.security = { + "auth_type": "none", + } + self.schema = {} + self.execution_mode = "Immediately" + self.response = {} + self.outputs = { + "query": { + "value": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + "headers": { + "value": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + "body": { + "value": {}, + "type": "object" + } + } def get_input_form(self) -> dict[str, dict]: return getattr(self, "inputs") diff --git a/api/apps/sdk/agents.py b/api/apps/sdk/agents.py index 20e897388..13a4798ba 100644 --- a/api/apps/sdk/agents.py +++ b/api/apps/sdk/agents.py @@ -14,14 +14,22 @@ # limitations under the License. # +import asyncio +import hashlib +import hmac +import ipaddress import json import logging +import re import time from typing import Any, cast +import jwt + from agent.canvas import Canvas from api.db import CanvasCategory from api.db.services.canvas_service import UserCanvasService +from api.db.services.file_service import FileService from api.db.services.user_canvas_version import UserCanvasVersionService from common.constants import RetCode from common.misc_utils import get_uuid @@ -132,48 +140,621 @@ def delete_agent(tenant_id: str, agent_id: str): UserCanvasService.delete_by_id(agent_id) return get_json_result(data=True) +_rate_limit_cache = {} -@manager.route('/webhook/', methods=['POST']) # noqa: F821 -@token_required -async def webhook(tenant_id: str, agent_id: str): - req = await get_request_json() - if not UserCanvasService.accessible(req["id"], tenant_id): - return get_json_result( - data=False, message='Only owner of canvas authorized for this operation.', - code=RetCode.OPERATING_ERROR) - - e, cvs = UserCanvasService.get_by_id(req["id"]) - if not e: - return get_data_error_result(message="canvas not found.") - - if not isinstance(cvs.dsl, str): - cvs.dsl = json.dumps(cvs.dsl, ensure_ascii=False) +@manager.route('/webhook/', methods=["POST", "GET", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "HEAD"]) # noqa: F821 +async def webhook(agent_id: str): + # 1. Fetch canvas by agent_id + exists, cvs = UserCanvasService.get_by_id(agent_id) + if not exists: + return get_data_error_result(message="Canvas not found.") + # 2. Check canvas category if cvs.canvas_category == CanvasCategory.DataFlow: return get_data_error_result(message="Dataflow can not be triggered by webhook.") + # 3. Load DSL from canvas + dsl = getattr(cvs, "dsl", None) + if not isinstance(dsl, dict): + return get_data_error_result(message="Invalid DSL format.") + + # 4. Check webhook configuration in DSL + webhook_cfg = dsl.get("webhook", {}) + if not webhook_cfg: + return get_data_error_result(message="Webhook not configured for this agent.") + + # 5. Validate request method against webhook_cfg.methods + allowed_methods = webhook_cfg.get("methods", []) + request_method = request.method.upper() + if allowed_methods and request_method not in allowed_methods: + return get_data_error_result( + message=f"HTTP method '{request_method}' not allowed for this webhook." + ) + + # 6. Validate webhook security + async def validate_webhook_security(security_cfg: dict): + """Validate webhook security rules based on security configuration.""" + + if not security_cfg: + return # No security config → allowed by default + + # 1. Validate max body size + await _validate_max_body_size(security_cfg) + + # 2. Validate IP whitelist + _validate_ip_whitelist(security_cfg) + + # # 3. Validate rate limiting + _validate_rate_limit(security_cfg) + + # 4. Validate authentication + auth_type = security_cfg.get("auth_type", "none") + + if auth_type == "none": + return + + if auth_type == "token": + _validate_token_auth(security_cfg) + + elif auth_type == "basic": + _validate_basic_auth(security_cfg) + + elif auth_type == "jwt": + _validate_jwt_auth(security_cfg) + + elif auth_type == "hmac": + await _validate_hmac_auth(security_cfg) + + else: + raise Exception(f"Unsupported auth_type: {auth_type}") + + async def _validate_max_body_size(security_cfg): + """Check request size does not exceed max_body_size.""" + max_size = security_cfg.get("max_body_size") + if not max_size: + return + + # Convert "10MB" → bytes + units = {"kb": 1024, "mb": 1024**2, "gb": 1024**3} + size_str = max_size.lower() + + for suffix, factor in units.items(): + if size_str.endswith(suffix): + limit = int(size_str.replace(suffix, "")) * factor + break + else: + raise Exception("Invalid max_body_size format") + + content_length = request.content_length or 0 + if content_length > limit: + raise Exception(f"Request body too large: {content_length} > {limit}") + + def _validate_ip_whitelist(security_cfg): + """Allow only IPs listed in ip_whitelist.""" + whitelist = security_cfg.get("ip_whitelist", []) + if not whitelist: + return + + client_ip = request.remote_addr + + + for rule in whitelist: + if "/" in rule: + # CIDR notation + if ipaddress.ip_address(client_ip) in ipaddress.ip_network(rule, strict=False): + return + else: + # Single IP + if client_ip == rule: + return + + raise Exception(f"IP {client_ip} is not allowed by whitelist") + + def _validate_rate_limit(security_cfg): + """Simple in-memory rate limiting.""" + rl = security_cfg.get("rate_limit") + if not rl: + return + + limit = rl.get("limit", 60) + per = rl.get("per", "minute") + + window = {"second": 1, "minute": 60, "hour": 3600}.get(per, 60) + key = f"rl:{agent_id}" + + now = int(time.time()) + bucket = _rate_limit_cache.get(key, {"ts": now, "count": 0}) + + # Reset window + if now - bucket["ts"] > window: + bucket = {"ts": now, "count": 0} + + bucket["count"] += 1 + _rate_limit_cache[key] = bucket + + if bucket["count"] > limit: + raise Exception("Too many requests (rate limit exceeded)") + + def _validate_token_auth(security_cfg): + """Validate header-based token authentication.""" + header = security_cfg.get("token_header") + token_value = security_cfg.get("token_value") + + provided = request.headers.get(header) + if provided != token_value: + raise Exception("Invalid token authentication") + + def _validate_basic_auth(security_cfg): + """Validate HTTP Basic Auth credentials.""" + auth_cfg = security_cfg.get("basic_auth", {}) + username = auth_cfg.get("username") + password = auth_cfg.get("password") + + auth = request.authorization + if not auth or auth.username != username or auth.password != password: + raise Exception("Invalid Basic Auth credentials") + + def _validate_jwt_auth(security_cfg): + """Validate JWT token in Authorization header.""" + jwt_cfg = security_cfg.get("jwt", {}) + secret = jwt_cfg.get("secret") + required_claims = jwt_cfg.get("required_claims", []) + + auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "") + if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer "): + raise Exception("Missing Bearer token") + + token = auth_header.replace("Bearer ", "") + + try: + decoded = jwt.decode( + token, + secret, + algorithms=[jwt_cfg.get("algorithm", "HS256")], + audience=jwt_cfg.get("audience"), + issuer=jwt_cfg.get("issuer"), + ) + except Exception as e: + raise Exception(f"Invalid JWT: {str(e)}") + + for claim in required_claims: + if claim not in decoded: + raise Exception(f"Missing JWT claim: {claim}") + + async def _validate_hmac_auth(security_cfg): + """Validate HMAC signature from header.""" + hmac_cfg = security_cfg.get("hmac", {}) + header = hmac_cfg.get("header") + secret = hmac_cfg.get("secret") + algorithm = hmac_cfg.get("algorithm", "sha256") + + provided_sig = request.headers.get(header) + if not provided_sig: + raise Exception("Missing HMAC signature header") + + body = await request.get_data() + if body is None: + body = b"" + elif isinstance(body, str): + body = body.encode("utf-8") + + computed = hmac.new(secret.encode(), body, getattr(hashlib, algorithm)).hexdigest() + + if not hmac.compare_digest(provided_sig, computed): + raise Exception("Invalid HMAC signature") + try: - canvas = Canvas(cvs.dsl, tenant_id, agent_id) + await validate_webhook_security(webhook_cfg.get("security", {})) + except Exception as e: + return get_data_error_result(message=str(e)) + + # 7. Parse request body + async def parse_webhook_request(): + """Parse request based on content-type and return structured data.""" + + # 1. Parse query parameters + query_data = {} + for k, v in request.args.items(): + query_data[k] = v + + # 2. Parse headers + header_data = {} + for k, v in request.headers.items(): + header_data[k] = v + + # 3. Parse body based on content-type + ctype = request.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";")[0].strip() + raw_files = {} + + if ctype == "application/json": + try: + body_data = await request.get_json() + except: + body_data = None + + elif ctype == "multipart/form-data": + form = await request.form + files = await request.files + raw_files = {name: file for name, file in files.items()} + body_data = { + "form": dict(form), + "files": {name: file.filename for name, file in files.items()}, + } + + elif ctype == "application/x-www-form-urlencoded": + form = await request.form + body_data = dict(form) + + elif ctype == "text/plain": + body_data = (await request.get_data()).decode() + + elif ctype == "application/octet-stream": + body_data = await request.get_data() # raw binary + + else: + # unknown content type → raw body + body_data = await request.get_data() + + return { + "query": query_data, + "headers": header_data, + "body": body_data, + "content_type": ctype, + "raw_files": raw_files + } + + def extract_by_schema(data, schema, name="section"): + """ + Extract only fields defined in schema. + Required fields must exist. + Optional fields default to type-based default values. + Type validation included. + """ + if schema.get("type") != "object": + return {} + + props = schema.get("properties", {}) + required = schema.get("required", []) + + extracted = {} + + for field, field_schema in props.items(): + field_type = field_schema.get("type") + + # 1. Required field missing + if field in required and field not in data: + raise Exception(f"{name} missing required field: {field}") + + # 2. Optional → default value + if field not in data: + extracted[field] = default_for_type(field_type) + continue + + raw_value = data[field] + + # 3. Auto convert value + try: + value = auto_cast_value(raw_value, field_type) + except Exception as e: + raise Exception(f"{name}.{field} auto-cast failed: {str(e)}") + + # 4. Type validation + if not validate_type(value, field_type): + raise Exception( + f"{name}.{field} type mismatch: expected {field_type}, got {type(value).__name__}" + ) + + extracted[field] = value + + return extracted + + + def default_for_type(t): + """Return default value for the given schema type.""" + if t == "file": + return "" + if t == "object": + return {} + if t == "boolean": + return False + if t == "number": + return 0 + if t == "string": + return "" + if t and t.startswith("array"): + return [] + if t == "null": + return None + return None + + def auto_cast_value(value, expected_type): + """Convert string values into schema type when possible.""" + + # Non-string values already good + if not isinstance(value, str): + return value + + v = value.strip() + + # Boolean + if expected_type == "boolean": + if v.lower() in ["true", "1"]: + return True + if v.lower() in ["false", "0"]: + return False + raise Exception(f"Cannot convert '{value}' to boolean") + + # Number + if expected_type == "number": + # integer + if v.isdigit() or (v.startswith("-") and v[1:].isdigit()): + return int(v) + + # float + try: + return float(v) + except: + raise Exception(f"Cannot convert '{value}' to number") + + # Object + if expected_type == "object": + try: + parsed = json.loads(v) + if isinstance(parsed, dict): + return parsed + else: + raise Exception("JSON is not an object") + except: + raise Exception(f"Cannot convert '{value}' to object") + + # Array + if expected_type.startswith("array"): + try: + parsed = json.loads(v) + if isinstance(parsed, list): + return parsed + else: + raise Exception("JSON is not an array") + except: + raise Exception(f"Cannot convert '{value}' to array") + + # String (accept original) + if expected_type == "string": + return value + + # File + if expected_type == "file": + return value + # Default: do nothing + return value + + + def validate_type(value, t): + """Validate value type against schema type t.""" + if t == "file": + return isinstance(value, str) + + if t == "string": + return isinstance(value, str) + + if t == "number": + return isinstance(value, (int, float)) + + if t == "boolean": + return isinstance(value, bool) + + if t == "object": + return isinstance(value, dict) + + # array / array / array + if t.startswith("array"): + if not isinstance(value, list): + return False + + if "<" in t and ">" in t: + inner = t[t.find("<") + 1 : t.find(">")] + + # Check each element type + for item in value: + if not validate_type(item, inner): + return False + + return True + + return True + + def extract_files_by_schema(raw_files, schema, name="files"): + """ + Extract and validate files based on schema. + Only supports type = file (single file). + Does NOT support array. + """ + + if schema.get("type") != "object": + return {} + + props = schema.get("properties", {}) + required = schema.get("required", []) + + cleaned = [] + + for field, field_schema in props.items(): + field_type = field_schema.get("type") + + # 1. Required field must exist + if field in required and field not in raw_files: + raise Exception(f"{name} missing required file field: {field}") + + # 2. Ignore fields that are not file + if field_type != "file": + continue + + # 3. Extract single file + file_obj = raw_files.get(field) + + if file_obj: + cleaned.append({ + "field": field, + "file": file_obj + }) + return cleaned + + parsed = await parse_webhook_request() + SCHEMA = webhook_cfg.get("schema", {"query": {}, "headers": {}, "body": {}}) + + # Extract strictly by schema + query_clean = extract_by_schema(parsed["query"], SCHEMA.get("query", {}), name="query") + header_clean = extract_by_schema(parsed["headers"], SCHEMA.get("headers", {}), name="headers") + body_clean = extract_by_schema(parsed["body"], SCHEMA.get("body", {}), name="body") + files_clean = extract_files_by_schema(parsed["raw_files"], SCHEMA.get("body", {}), name="files") + + uploaded_files = [] + for item in files_clean: # each {field, file} + file_obj = item["file"] + desc = FileService.upload_info( + cvs.user_id, # user + file_obj, # FileStorage + None # url (None for webhook) + ) + uploaded_files.append(desc) + + clean_request = { + "query": query_clean, + "headers": header_clean, + "body": body_clean + } + + if not isinstance(cvs.dsl, str): + dsl = json.dumps(cvs.dsl, ensure_ascii=False) + try: + canvas = Canvas(dsl, cvs.user_id, agent_id) except Exception as e: return get_json_result( data=False, message=str(e), code=RetCode.EXCEPTION_ERROR) - async def sse(): - nonlocal canvas - try: - async for ans in canvas.run(query=req.get("query", ""), files=req.get("files", []), user_id=req.get("user_id", tenant_id), webhook_payload=req): - yield "data:" + json.dumps(ans, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n" + execution_mode = webhook_cfg.get("execution_mode", "Immediately") + response_cfg = webhook_cfg.get("response", {}) - cvs.dsl = json.loads(str(canvas)) - UserCanvasService.update_by_id(req["id"], cvs.to_dict()) - except Exception as e: - logging.exception(e) - yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 500, "message": str(e), "data": False}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n" + if execution_mode == "Immediately": + status = response_cfg.get("status", 200) + headers_tpl = response_cfg.get("headers_template", {}) + body_tpl = response_cfg.get("body_template", {}) - resp = Response(sse(), mimetype="text/event-stream") - resp.headers.add_header("Cache-control", "no-cache") - resp.headers.add_header("Connection", "keep-alive") - resp.headers.add_header("X-Accel-Buffering", "no") - resp.headers.add_header("Content-Type", "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8") - return resp + + placeholder_pattern = re.compile(r"\{* *\{([a-zA-Z:0-9]+@[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+|sys\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+|env\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)\} *\}*") + def extract_placeholder_value(placeholder: str, clean_request: dict): + """ + Extract values from clean_request using placeholders like: + {webhook@body.payload} + {webhook@query.event} + {webhook@headers.X-Trace-ID} + """ + + # Example placeholder: webhook@body.payload + if "@" in placeholder: + prefix, path = placeholder.split("@", 1) + + return get_from_request_path(clean_request, path) + + # sys.xxx / env.xxx handled by canvas, do not resolve here + return None + + def get_from_request_path(clean_request: dict, path: str): + """ + Resolve path like: + body.payload + query.event + headers.X-Token + """ + + parts = path.split(".") + if len(parts) == 0: + return None + + root = parts[0] # body / query / headers + + if root not in clean_request: + return None + + value = clean_request[root] + + for p in parts[1:]: + if isinstance(value, dict) and p in value: + value = value[p] + else: + return None + + return value + + def render_template(text: str, clean_request: dict): + matches = placeholder_pattern.findall(text) + results = {} + + for m in matches: + val = extract_placeholder_value(m, clean_request) + results[m] = val + + return results + # Render "{xxx@query.xxx}" syntax + headers = render_template(headers_tpl, clean_request) + body = render_template(body_tpl, clean_request) + + resp = Response( + json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False), + status=status, + content_type="application/json" + ) + + # Add custom headers + for k, v in headers.items(): + resp.headers[k] = v + async def background_run(): + try: + async for _ in canvas.run( + query="", + files=uploaded_files, + user_id=cvs.user_id, + webhook_payload=clean_request + ): + pass # or log/save ans + + cvs.dsl = json.loads(str(canvas)) + UserCanvasService.update_by_id(cvs.user_id, cvs.to_dict()) + + except Exception as e: + logging.exception(f"Webhook background run failed: {e}") + + asyncio.create_task(background_run()) + return resp + else: + + async def sse(): + nonlocal canvas + + try: + async for ans in canvas.run( + query="", + files=uploaded_files, + user_id=cvs.user_id, + webhook_payload=clean_request + ): + yield "data:" + json.dumps(ans, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n" + + # save updated canvas + cvs.dsl = json.loads(str(canvas)) + UserCanvasService.update_by_id(cvs.user_id, cvs.to_dict()) + + except Exception as e: + logging.exception(e) + yield "data:" + json.dumps( + {"code": 500, "message": str(e), "data": False}, + ensure_ascii=False + ) + "\n\n" + + resp = Response(sse(), mimetype="text/event-stream") + resp.headers.add_header("Cache-control", "no-cache") + resp.headers.add_header("Connection", "keep-alive") + resp.headers.add_header("X-Accel-Buffering", "no") + resp.headers.add_header("Content-Type", "text/event-stream; charset=utf-8") + return resp